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ABSTRACT

Benefit corporation proponents argue that the new social enterprise
entity form "meets higher standards of corporate purpose, accountability, and
transparency." This Article analyzes the transparency claim by examining
hand-collected benefit report data and the substantive statutory reporting
requirements. Data from early benefit corporations shows an abysmal benefit
report compliance rate (below ten percent), drawing into question the claims
about heightened transparency. This Article also provides reasons to doubt the
efficacy of the current substantive reporting requirements due to the lack of
specificity and lack of effective enforcement mechanisms in most states'
benefit corporation statutes. This Article explains how policy, theory, and now
early data, all point to significant deficiencies in the benefit reporting
framework. Finally, this Article concludes with suggestions to strengthen the
benefit corporation reporting requirements, increase compliance rates, and
encourage benefit corporation transparency.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Benefit corporation proponents argue that the new social enterprise
entity form "meets higher standards of corporate purpose, accountability, and
transparency."' This Article analyzes the transparency claim by examining
hand-collected benefit report data and the substantive statutory reporting
requirements. Data from early benefit corporations shows an abysmal benefit
report compliance rate (below ten percent), drawing into question the claims
about heightened transparency. This Article also provides reasons to doubt the
efficacy of the current substantive reporting requirements due to the lack of
specificity and lack of effective enforcement mechanisms in most states'
benefit corporation statutes. This Article explains how policy, theory, and now
early data, all point to significant deficiencies in the benefit reporting
framework. Finally, this Article concludes with suggestions to strengthen the
benefit corporation reporting requirements, increase compliance rates, and
encourage benefit corporation transparency.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the social enterprise
forms in the United States and the early academic literature in this area. Part III
unpacks the hand-collected data on benefit reports that is the cornerstone of this
Article. Part IV examines the mandatory disclosure literature, describes the
current state of benefit corporation reporting-including the noncompliance
problem and the weakness of the substantive reporting requirement-and
provides suggestions to improve future compliance rates and usefulness of the

I
Yusi Wang Turell, B-Corps Provide Purpose and Profit, Bus. NH MAG. (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://millyardcommunications.com /index.php?src=news&refno=4404&category-News.
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benefit reports. This Article concludes with a summary of the Article's primary
arguments and makes suggestions for future research.
II.

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF BENEFIT CORPORATION
LAW

A. Social EnterpriseLaw in the United States
Currently, social enterprise law in the United States involves for-profit
companies that pursue a public purpose.2 Social enterprise statutes appear to
have evolved, at least in part, from constituency statutes. While most state
constituency statutes are permissive and simply allow consideration of various
stakeholders, most social enterprise statutes are mandatory and require
consideration of stakeholders beyond merely shareholders.3 Vermont passed
the first U.S. social enterprise statute in 2008, allowing for the formation of
"low-profit, limited liability companies" ("L3C"). 4 Additional social enterprise
statutes followed, allowing the formation of benefit corporations, benefit LLCs,
flexible purpose corporations, general benefit corporations, public benefit
corporations, social purpose corporations, specific benefit corporations, and

2

Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REv. 59, 62-63

(2010) (stating that "social enterprises" can be for-profit or non-profit entities but noting that the
current U.S. statutes are focused on for-profit social enterprises).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (2015) (the Vermont L3C statute, on which most of
the L3C state statutes are based, requiring that the L3C "significantly furthers the
accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes" and requiring that the L3C
"would not have been formed but for the company's relationship to the accomplishment of
charitable or educational purposes"); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

§§

102, 301(a) (2014),

http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/ModelBenefitCorpLegislation.pdf
(defining a benefit corporation's general public benefit purpose as "[a] material positive impact
on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from
the business and operations of a benefit corporation" and requiring consideration of various
corporate stakeholders); Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and

Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REv. 269, 289 (2013) (noting that benefit corporation laws
mandate the consideration of stakeholder interests, while traditional corporate law merely allows
it); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easierfor Directors to "Do the Right Thing"?, 4 HARV. Bus. L.

REv. 235, 243 (2014) (contrasting the Delaware version of the benefit corporation statute, called a
"public benefit corporation" statute, with constituency statutes and noting that constituency
statutes are permissive, while the Delaware public benefit corporation statute mandates balancing
the interests of various corporate constituencies); John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of
Having "Two Masters": A Frameworkfor L3C FiduciaryDuties and Accountability, 35 VT. L.

REv. 117, 128 (2010) (stating that the L3C statutes mandate operation of the entity primarily to
further charitable ends).
4
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (2015); John A. Pearce II & Jamie P. Hopkins,
Regulation of L3 Cs for Social Entrepreneurship:A Prerequisiteto Increased Utilization, 92 NEB.

L. REv. 259, 260 (2013).
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sustainable business corporations. 5 These social enterprise forms can be
condensed into three basic types: benefit entities, L3Cs, and social purpose
corporations. Each of these forms has been discussed more extensively in other
academic articles by this Author and others.6
To date, eight states have an L3C statute and two states have a social
purpose corporation statute.7 The L3C was initially designed to target program
related investments from foundations and, among the social enterprise statutes
in the United States, the L3C statutes are the clearest in their prioritizing of
social purpose over financial profits. The two social purpose corporation
statutes, previously called the flexible purpose corporation statute in California,
were passed to provide more freedom to managers by allowing a more narrow
8
social purpose than is permissible under some other social enterprise statutes.
The benefit corporation form has emerged as the most popular social enterprise
statute type, with over two dozen states enacting some sort of benefit
corporation statute.9 The following sections provide an overview of the benefit

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REv.

387, 402 (2014) (discussing the benefit LLC form); Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing
Good and Doing Well: FiduciaryDuty in Benefit Corporations,20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.

19, 30-31 (2014) (discussing Minnesota's general benefit corporation and specific benefit
corporation forms); J. Haskell Murray, Social EnterpriseInnovation: Delaware'sPublic Benefit
Corporation Law, 4 HARv. Bus. L. REv. 345, 347-64 (2014) [hereinafter Murray, Social
EnterpriseInnovation] (comparing the benefit corporation and public benefit corporation laws);
Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 681-82

(2013) (listing many of the social enterprise entity forms and noting that the proliferation is likely
to continue).
6
See, e.g., Katz & Page, supra note 2, at 62-63; Murray, Social EnterpriseInnovation,
supra note 5.

7
Reiser, supra note 5, at 689 n.31 (stating that Washington and California are the only two
states to pass social purpose corporation and flexible purpose corporation statutes); Here's the

3
Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L C, http://www.intersectorl3c.com/13c-tally.html
Flexible Purpose Corporations Change Their
Plerhoples,
2015);
Alicia
Oct.
8,
(last visited

Name, SocENTLAW.COM (Oct. 20, 2014), http://socentlaw.com/2014/10/flexible-purposecorporations-change-their-name/ (stating that California's flexible purpose corporation statute
was renamed as a "social purpose corporation" statute, effective January 1, 2015, to match
Washington state's name for its similar statute).
8

Dana Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing: Flexible Purpose Corporations,2 AM. U. Bus.

L. REv. 55, 57-60 (2012) (describing the increased flexibility of the social purpose corporation
statutes as compared to the benefit corporation statutes).
9

State

by

State

Status

of

Legislation,

BENEFIT

CORP.,

http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). As ofOctober
8, 2015, 30 states and the District of Columbia had passed some form of benefit corporation
statute. Id. The benefit corporation umbrella extends to cover statutes allowing for the formation

of benefit corporations, public benefit corporations, sustainable business corporations, general
benefit corporations, and specific corporations. Benefit LLC statutes are built on an LLC base,
not a corporate base, but the benefit LLC statutes also largely follow the benefit corporation
principles. The primary distinguishing characteristic of benefit corporation laws is that they
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corporation law and examine in more detail the benefit report requirements,
which are the focus of this Article.' 0
B. Benefit CorporationLaw in General

Benefit corporation statutes require directors to consider the interests of
a multitude of corporate stakeholders, while pursuing a general public benefit
purpose. Benefit corporation proponents claim that the market is demanding
social enterprise laws and that the traditional legal frameworks are insufficient
for social entrepreneurs." According to proponents, a benefit corporation
"meets higher standards of corporate purpose, accountability, and
transparency." 2 Each of these three claims deserves separate, critical attention.
First, the higher standard of corporate purpose claim is tied to the statutory
requirement that benefit corporations have a "general public benefit purpose" to
make "[a] material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations
of a benefit corporation." 1 3 Second, the "greater accountability" claim is tied to
the statutory provisions that (1) require the directors to consider various groups
of corporate stakeholders in their decisions, including shareholders, employees,
customers, the community, and the environment; (2) mandate the firm be
measured against a third-party standard; and (3) provide for the bringing of
benefit enforcement lawsuit for statutory violations.1 4 Finally, the "greater

require a general public benefit purpose and mandate the consideration or balancing of the
interests of various corporate stakeholders.
10
See infra Part II.B-C.
11 WILLIAM H. CLARK JR. & LARRY VRANKA, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL
PUBLIC
(2013),
THE
AND,
ULTIMATELY,
INVESTORS,
ENTREPRENEURS,
2

&

http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Benefit%2Corporation%2White% OPaper.
pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) [hereinafter PROPONENT WHITE PAPER].
12
What Is a Benefit Corporation?, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/businesses (last
visited Oct. 8, 2015).
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/
102 (2014),
§
LEGIS.
CORP.
BENEFIT
MODEL
'3
default/files/documents/ModelBenefitCorpLegislation.pdf.; see William H. Clark, Jr.
Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business
Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 817, 839-42 (2012) (calling the benefit corporation
approach to corporate purpose a "holistic approach [that] is meant to be both comprehensive and
flexible"). But see Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 Bus. LAw. 1007, 1036 (2013) (calling the benefit corporation law both too broad
and too narrow because it does not allow deviation from the general public benefit purpose).
PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 17; MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 301(a),
14
305. Directors and officers of benefit corporations are not subject to monetary liability, however,
for any failure to pursue or create a general public benefit. Id. §§ 302(e), 303(c). Further, of all
the stakeholders that must be considered by benefit corporation directors, only shareholders have
statutorily granted standing to bring a benefit enforcement proceeding. Id. § 305(c). In the current
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transparency" claim is primarily tied to the benefit reporting requirements.s
While all three claims can be seriously questioned, this Article focuses on the
transparency claim, with some attention paid to the accountability claim as
well.
C Benefit ReportingRequirements
Sections 401 and 402 of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation
(the "Model") contain the benefit report requirements, which mandate the
following narrative descriptions in the report:16
(i) The ways in which the benefit corporation pursued general
public benefit during the year and the extent to which general
public benefit was created. (ii) Both: (A) the ways in which the
benefit corporation pursued a specific public benefit that the
articles of incorporation state it is the purpose of the benefit
corporation to create; and (B) the extent to which that specific
public benefit was created. (iii) Any circumstances that have
hindered the creation by the benefit corporation of general
public benefit or specific public benefit. (iv) The process and
rationale for selecting or changing the third-party standard used
to prepare the benefit report.
The Model also requires the following:
An assessment of the overall social and environmental
performance of the benefit corporation against a third-party
standard [to be] applied consistently with any application of
that standard in prior benefit reports or [to be] accompanied by
an explanation of the reasons for . .
any inconsistent
application, or ... the change to that standard from the one
used in the immediately prior report.18

version of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation and some state statutes, a minimum of two
percent of the shareholders are needed to bring a benefit enforcement proceeding. Id. § 305(c)(2).
1s

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

§§

401-02; see Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public

Benefit Corporations90 Days Out: Who's Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 247, 254 (2014)
(comparing the reporting requirements of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation and the
Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Law).
16

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

17

Id.
Id.

18

§§

401-02.

§ 40 1(a)(1).
§ 401(a)(2); see also How Do I Pick a Third Party Standard?, BENEFIT

CORP.,

http://benefitcorp.net/third-party-standards/list-of-standards
(last visited Oct. 8, 2015)
[hereinafter ThirdParty Standard] (compiling some of the potential third-party standards).
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The benefit report must further contain names and addresses for any benefit
director and benefit officer, compensation paid to each director for her services
as director, an annual compliance statement from the benefit director, and
disclosure of potential material conflicts between the third-party standard
provider and the benefit corporation.19 The statute makes clear that "[n]either
the benefit report nor the assessment of the performance of the benefit
corporation in the benefit report ... needs to be audited or certified by a third
party." 2 0 The benefit report must be sent to shareholders within 120 days of the
end of the benefit corporation's fiscal year or at the same time as another
annual report. 21 Each benefit corporation must publish the benefit report on a
freely-accessible portion of its Internet website; if the benefit corporation does
not have a website, it must make the benefit report available, free of charge, to
anyone who asks.22 Finally, the Model states that the benefit report must be
filed with the Secretary of State at the same time the report is sent to
shareholders.2 3
With the exception of the state-filing requirement, the vast majority of
state benefit corporation laws have largely followed the Model's reporting
requirements. 24 The resistance to the state-filing requirement may be due to the
already strained state resources, even though the Model suggests states require
a fee to accompany the filing of the benefit report, which could offset at least a
portion of the costs to the state.25 Currently, a minority of states require filing
27
the report with a government entity; 26 a majority of states do not. A few states

19

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

20

Id.

§

401(c);

see

§ 401(a)(3)-(6).
also

Make

It

Official,

BCORPORATION.NET,

(last
https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/make-it-official
visited Oct. 8, 2015) (showing B Lab currently charges $500 to $50,000+ per year for its
certification, depending on annual revenue of the company to be certified). The benefit
corporation statutes, however, do not require certification, but rather only the use of a third-party
standard. B Lab provides its third-party standard for free online. Clark & Babson, supra note 13,
at 846.
21
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 402(a).
22
Id. § 402(b)-(c).
23
Id. § 402(d). The Model notes that "compensation paid to directors and financial or
proprietary information" may be excluded from the filed and publicly posted versions of the
benefit report. Id. § 402(c).
24
J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes
9 8 85 6
5
(Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished chart), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1
Chart].
Enterprise
Social
of
[hereinafter Corporate Forms
25
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 402(d).
26

See infra Table B.

CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630 (Deering 2015); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-101-501-509 (2015);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1364 (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2015); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 607.612-613 (LexisNexis 2015); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 420D-11-12 (2015); 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 40/5.01 (West 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1831-1832 (2015); MD.
27
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have expressly stated penalties for failing to produce a benefit report, but most
states have not stated a specific penalty and may be relying on the broad benefit
enforcement proceedings to enforce the reporting requirements.28
Delaware cut its own path on benefit reporting and departed
significantly from the Model. The Delaware Public Benefit Corporation
("PBC") law allows significantly more private ordering than does the Model.2 9
For example, the Delaware PBC law requires a report no less than biennially
(instead of annually) and does not require publication of the report on the
Internet, unless specifically required by the given business's governing
documents. 30 The Delaware PBC report must be sent to shareholders and must
include:
(1) The objectives the board of directors has established to
promote such public benefit or public benefits and interests; (2)
The standards the board of directors has adopted to measure
the corporation's progress in promoting such public benefit or
public benefits and interests; (3) Objective factual information
based on those standards regarding the corporation's success in
meeting the objectives for promoting such public benefit or
public benefits and interests; and (4) An assessment of the
corporation's success in meeting the objectives and promoting
such public benefit or public benefits and interests."
While benefit corporation proponents generally celebrate the passage
of the Delaware PBC law and include it under the benefit corporation umbrella,
representatives of B Lab have opposed Delaware's stance on benefit reports,
considering it too flexible.32 Colorado, which followed Delaware in many

CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78B.170180 (LexisNexis 2015); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1708 (McKinney 2015); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §
60.768 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791 (2015);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.150 (LexisNexis 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31F-5-501
(LexisNexis 2015).
28
See Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise Chart, supra note 24.
29
Murray, Social EnterpriseInnovation, supra note 5, at 351-54.
30
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2015).
31
Id. § 366(b)(1)-(4).
32
Governor Markell Signs Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, NEWS.DELAWARE.GOV
(July 17, 2013), http://news.delaware.gov/2013/07/17/govemor-markell-signs-public-benefitcorporation-legislation/; Telephone Interview with Erik Trojian, Dir. of Policy, B Lab (Aug. 15,
2013) [hereinafter Trojian, Interview] (stating that Delaware's reporting requirements were not as
strong as B Lab would like, due to the lower frequency and the lack of required posting or filing
of the report). B Lab is a nonprofit organization that created the B Corp certification and has
played the primary role in supporting benefit corporation legislation. About B Lab,
BCORPORATION.NET, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-lab
(last visited
Oct. 8, 2015).
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areas, adopted reporting requirements closer to the Model.3 3 As will be shown
below, however, none of the states' benefit reporting requirements are ideal,
and all of the benefit reportinq requirements could be improved through
thoughtful statutory amendments.
III. BENEFIT REPORT DATA
A.

Hypothesis

Benefit corporation proponents have defended the benefit corporation
statutes, in part, by arguing that the statutes promote greater transparency.3 s
The required benefit report, using a third-party standard, is the primary method
by which this transparency is supposedly accomplished.36 The initial hypothesis
was that reporting compliance would not be complete, but might reach 30-60%
compliance.37 As explained in more detail below, a low compliance could be
explained by relatively high learning costs, limited resources of the relevant
benefit corporations, and lack of effective statutory enforcement mechanisms.
As will be shown, the actual compliance rate is below 10%, which is
significantly worse than the weak hypothesized compliance rate of 30-60%.39
B. Methodology
In July of 2014, I searched for the benefit reports of benefit
corporations that were formed in 2012 or before from Virginia, New York,
California, and Hawaii. I chose these four states because they were the only

34

COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-101-507 (2015).
See infra Part IV.B-C.

35

PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 17-20; William H. Clark, Jr., The New

3

Pennsylvania Benefit CorporationLaw, 84 PA. B. Ass'N
36

Q. 65, 69 (2013).

PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 17-20.

37
Richard L. Doemberg, The Case Against Withholding, 61 TEx. L. REv. 595, 599-603
(1982) (noting an estimated 60% compliance rate with filing of 1099 forms); cf Matthew P.
Harrington & Eric A. Lustig, IRS Form 8300: The Attorney-Client Privilege and Tax Policy
Become Casualties in the War Against Money Laundering, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 623, 636 n.57
(1996) (noting a 42% compliance rate by small corporations filing of IRS Form 8300).
38
J. William Callison, PuttingNew Sheets on a ProcrusteanBed: How Benefit Corporations
Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestionsfor Change, 2 AM. U. Bus. L.
REv. 85, 110 (2012) (noting the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms in the benefit
corporation law); see, e.g., Message on LinkedIn from Brandi DeCarli, Farm from a Box, to J.
Haskell Murray (July 10, 2014, 3:40 PM) (on file with author) (claiming that her company had
not completed a benefit report because they "are in pilot mode without revenue yet," suggesting
that she was not aware of the lack of a revenue-based exception for the benefit reporting
requirements).
3
See infra Part III.C.
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states that had benefit corporation statutes effective before 2012 and also made
the dates of benefit corporation formation in their states freely available. While
the number of states is rather small, the four states represent both the eastern
and western United States and also represent some of the largest U.S. states.
The benefit corporation sample, comprised of benefit corporations formed in or
prior to 2012 in these four states, totaled 123 benefit corporations.4 0 I searched
the website for each benefit corporation in the sample, attempting to locate its
benefit report. 4 ' For the benefit corporations that did not have a website, I
attempted to contact one or more representatives for the company or the
company's registered agent.42 I contacted all of these companies within a single
week because the social enterprise community is small. If I elongated the
process, I knew benefit corporation managers and their lawyers might be in to
talk, quickly produce a report to satisfy my request, and skew the sample.
C.

Benefit Report Results

As mentioned in the previous section, the data set started with 123
benefit corporations from 4 states." Of this group, 23 were inactive, dissolved,
or merged out of existence per the Secretaries of States' websites. 4 5 This left an
even 100 active benefit corporations in the sample.46 Of the active benefit
corporations, only eight percent had a benefit report. 4 7 Seventy-six of the active
benefit corporations had a website, while 22 of the 24 benefit corporations
without a website were non-responsive to e-mail or LinkedIn messages.48 The
two representatives that did respond admitted to not having produced a benefit

See infra Table A.
While it is possible that I overlooked some benefit reports, I scoured each page of each
website and if I somehow missed the benefit report, it is likely that the average shareholder or
consumer would have a difficult time finding the benefit report.
42
1 used e-mail, where available, and LinkedIn, where e-mail was not available or effective,
to message the benefit corporation managers or registered agents.
43
As a result of this Article, I hope that benefit reporting compliance rates rise and reforms
are made to the statutory reporting provisions. I am confident that compliance rates are already
rising due, in part, to my discussion of the results of my research in social enterprise circles.
However, I did not want to taint the data by drawing out the process and giving the benefit
corporations time to quickly comply before I finalized my data.
40
41

See infra Table A.
Id.; cf Eric T. Wagner, Five Reasons 8 out of 10 Businesses Fail, FORBES (Sept. 12,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericwagner/2013/09/12/five-reasons-8-out-of-10-businessesfail/ (claiming that approximately 80% of businesses fail within the first 18 months).
4
See infra Table A.
4

45

47

Id

Id. As mentioned above, LinkedIn requests and messages were used when the e-mail
addresses of the company representatives were not available or if the representatives did not
respond to my e-mail messages.
48
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report. 49 Even if the 22 non-responsive companies were removed from the
sample, the compliance rate would only rise to approximately ten percent;
however, the benefit corporation statutes require companies without websites to
respond to requests and provide benefit reports to anyone who asks, so eight
percent seems to be the more proper compliance rate.50
IV. PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF SOCIAL REPORTING

A.

Overview ofMandatory Disclosure Literature

Much has been written about corporate disclosure in the academic
literature, and the lessons learned may be applied to the benefit corporation and
social business experience.51 Many, if not most, disclosure-related articles
include a reference to Louis Brandeis's maxim that "[s]unlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." 52 A strand of
the legal scholarship has embraced the idea of mandatory disclosure and claims
that more open access to company information is a solution for a number of
Mandatory disclosure has been touted to address
regulatory issues.

49
Even armed with an admission of statutory violation, customers have no standing to
challenge the failure to produce a benefit report.
50
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600-14623 (Deering 2015); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-1-13
(2015); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1701-1709 (Consol. 2015); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782-791
(2015). The 22 non-responsive benefit corporations could be on the verge of dissolution or not
conducting business, though technically active. There is no exception in the statutory reporting
requirements for benefit corporations that are pre-revenue, on the brink of dissolution, or just in
the planning stages of the business.

51

&

See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's New Role as
Diplomatic and HumanitarianWatchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 1315 (2012).
52
Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1933); see, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff

Claire A. Hill, Limits ofDisclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 605 (2013); Tamar Frankel, The
Failureof Investor Protectionby Disclosure, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 421, 427 n.10 (2012); Henry T.
C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, "Pure Information, " and the SEC Disclosure

Paradigm, 90 TEx. L. REv. 1601, 1615 (2012); Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of
Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 479-80 (2007);

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, DisclosuresAbout Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 258 (2010); Victoria
Schwartz, Disclosing CorporateDisclosurePolicies, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 492 (2013).
s3

See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failureand the Economic Case for a Mandatory

Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 721-22 (1984) (explaining the theoretical justifications
for a mandatory disclosure system); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure:

Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1337-42 (1999) (arguing
in favor of our current federal, mandatory securities system and that giving issuers more choice
in regulatory scheme would result in under-disclosure and social harm); Michael D. Guttentag,
An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.

REV. 123, 194 (2004) (arguing for increased mandatory disclosure for corporations, given the
significant "potential cost of a market failure in public company disclosure practices"); Robert
Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals
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information deficits, reduce information asymmetry, and increase social utility
by providing previously undisclosed data to corporate stakeholders.
Proponents have argued that mandatory disclosure of social impact can
supplement the occasionally insufficient power of market pressures and the
social responsibility commitments of firms. 5 From the 1960s to the 1980s,
George Stigler, Henry Manne, and George Bentson, among others, criticized
the mandatory corporate disclosure system. 56 More recently, a new generation
of scholars has joined in questioning the value of mandatory disclosure, or at
least argues that we are "drowning in disclosure." 57 Even Warren Buffett has

for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1399-1400 (2002) (finding persuasive the claim that firms
will not provide the socially optimal amount of information if left unregulated); Joel Seligman,
The HistoricalNeed for a Mandatory CorporateDisclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983)
(providing the justifications for a mandatory federal corporate disclosure system overseen by the
Securities and Exchange Commission); Randall S. Thomas, Improving ShareholderMonitoring
and Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIz. L. REV.
331, 369-71 (1996) (suggesting automatic or streamlined access to certain types of corporate
records for certain shareholders).
54
Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global CorporateStrategy, 35 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 87, 91 (2014).
5
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711, 756 (2006); Park, supra note 54, at 93-94 (citing Larry E. Ribstein,
Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431,
1454-55 (2006)); Cynthia Williams, Text of Remarks on Panel: "Codes of Conduct and
Transparency," 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 421 (2001).
56
George J. Benston, The Costs and Benefits of Government-RequiredDisclosure: SEC and
FTC Requirements: An Appraisal, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND
REFORM 37 (Deborah A. DeMott ed., 1980); HENRY MANNE ET AL., WALL STREET IN TRANSITION

(1974); George J. Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required
Disclosure SEC and FTC Requirements, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1977, at 30, 60

(arguing that, in general, the costs of government mandated disclosure exceeds the benefits);
George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: Rejoinder, 65 AM. ECON. REV.
473 (1975); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, MandatoryDisclosureand the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities
Markets, 19 Bus. LAw 721 (1964).
5

PAUL G. MAHONEY, WASTING A CRISIS: WHY SECURITIES REGULATION FAILS 78 (2015)

&

(noting that disclosure has associated costs and that an increase in disclosure is not always
advantageous); Celia R. Taylor, Drowning in Disclosure: The Overburdeningof the Securities
Exchange Commission, 8 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 85, 87-88 (2014) (noting that the "SEC is
increasingly becoming a disclosure dumping ground" and commenting on the "staggering
number of disclosure issues that the SEC is either required or has chosen to take under its
control"); see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failureof MandatedDisclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 679 (2011) ("Mandated disclosure is not doomed to fail, but it rarely
succeeds. On analysis, one can see why failure is virtually inherent in the regulatory technique.
Success requires three actors-lawmakers, disclosers, and disclosees-to play demanding parts
properly. Rarely can each actor accomplish all that is needed, and therefore mandated disclosures
rarely work as planned."); Manne, supra note 52, at 474 n.3 (noting that sometimes disclosure's
costs outweigh its benefits); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost Benefit
Analysis in FinancialDisclosure Regulation (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working
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questioned the efficacy of disclosure, stating in the context of derivative
regulation, that,
[i]mproved "transparency"-a favorite remedy of politicians,
commentators and financial regulators for averting future train
wrecks-won't cure the problems . . .. When I read the pages

of "disclosure" in 10-Ks of companies that are entangled with
these instruments, all I end up knowing is that I don 't know
what is oing on in their portfolios (and then I reach for some
aspirin). 8
In their 2014 book, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of

Mandated Disclosure, law professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider
make a case against mandated disclosure as a legislative remedy, and their
book includes citation to much of the relevant scholarship.59 Ben-Shahar and
Schneider admit that mandated disclosure might be an appropriate regulatory
tool in some cases, but claim that the benefits of mandated disclosure are often
greatly exaggerated and the costs of mandated disclosure are often seriously
underestimated.o On the exaggerated benefits of mandated disclosure, the
authors point to the complexity of many disclosures, the innumeracy and
illiteracy of many readers, and the burden of the accumulating amounts of
disclosure as things that limit the effectiveness of disclosure.6 ' According to the
authors, the underestimated costs of mandated disclosure include less focus on
better regulation, significant expenditures to collect data and draft disclosures,
and the burden on the public of dealing with the many disclosures. 62 BenShahar and Schneider do not offer a replacement for mandated disclosure,
claiming instead that there is no panacea and arguing that each issue should be

Paper No. 680, 2014) [hereinafter The Futility of Cost Benefit Analysis],
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2412688; Jesse Eisinger, The Trouble with
Disclosure: It Doesn't Work,
THE
TRADE
(Feb.
11,
2015,
1:00
PM),
http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/the-trouble-with-disclosure-it-doesnt-work (questioning
the usefulness of disclosures); Adam J. Levitin, Disclosure Presentation, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 11,
2013), http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/1657958-disclosure-presentation.html (noting
that there is "scant empirical work on disclosure efficacy").
Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to
58
S'holders, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 27, 2009), http:// www.berkshirehathaway.com/
letters/20081tr.pdf.
See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
5
KNow: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).

Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 14-118.
62
Id. at 169-82; see also The Futility of Cost Benefit Analysis, supra note 57, at 9-10
(claiming that the costs of mandated disclosure appear extremely low, but that costs from
regulating, complying, and litigating due to mandated disclosures are quite significant).
60
61
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considered on its own terms with the appropriate regulatory tools employed.
For benefit corporations, a balance must be struck between the benefits of the
mandatory disclosures to various corporate stakeholders and the costs of the
disclosures for the firms.
B. CorporateTheory and Reporting
Views on mandatory benefit reporting may depend on the theory of the
corporation that is embraced. Professor Stefan Padfield helpfully summarizes
theories of the corporation into five basic categories: entity theory, contract
theory, concession theory, process theory (including director-primacy and
team-production theory), and nexus-of-contracts theory (contractarianism). 64
While scholars could quibble on the categories and the nuances of the
definitions, these rough divisions will suffice for the purpose of this Article,
and the Article will focus only on the last three: concession theory, process
theory (including director-primacy and team-production theory), and nexus-ofcontracts theory (contractarianism).s
Concession theory focuses on the grants of limited liability,
transferability of ownership, and potentially permanent legal existence by the
state to the corporation. Due to these grants by the state, concession theory
assumes that the government may regulate the corporation and that the
corporation should benefit society.67 Concession theory was most popular
between the 17th and 19th centuries, and the theory stems from a time when the
state granted charters individually and based on some social benefit. 6 8 In 1978,
63

BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 59, at 190-95.

6
Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign
Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 835-37 (2013) (noting that concession theory and
artificial entity theory; nexus of contracts (contractarianism) and aggregate theory; and process
theory and real (natural) entity theory are three essentially synonymous pairs).
65
Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327,
330-31
(2014) [hereinafter Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory] (describing the three main
theories under corporate law, as opposed to constitutional law, as "(1) concession theory, (2)
[process theory] director-primacy and team-production theory, and (3) nexus-of-contracts theory
(contractarianism)").
66

Id. at 332-33 (citing REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A

COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 5 (2d ed. 2009)).
67
Id. at 355.

Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating
that "at first, the corporate privilege was granted sparingly; and only when the grant seemed
necessary in order to procure for the community some specific benefit otherwise unattainable");
Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 37 n.42 (2014);
Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving CorporatePersonhood, 2011 UTAH L. REv. 1629, 1630, 1640
[hereinafter Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood] (claiming that "[v]iewing the
corporation as a concession from the state is a relic of a time before incorporating became a mere
administrative formality." Pollman later notes that "[t]he economic expansion of [the end of the
68
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the Supreme Court of the United States referred to concession theory as an
"extreme position," but the Supreme Court's characterization of concession
theory was an argument that "corporations, as creatures of the State, have only
those rights granted them by the State." 69 More recently, scholars have chosen
to define concession theory as merely giving "deference to government
regulation, as opposed to removing all limits on the state's right to regulate
corporations." 70 This theory fits with benefit corporation reporting in the sense
that it provides support for states to regulate firms. Concession theory makes
even more sense in the benefit corporation context because the state is making
an additional grant to firms, the positive moniker of "benefit corporation."
Director primacy 7 ' and team production theory 72 both consider the
board of directors in ultimate control of the corporation; both theories can be
grouped in what Robert W. Hamilton and Richard Booth call "process
theory."73 On occasion, Stephen Bainbridge's director primacy theory has been
coupled with a shareholder wealth maximization norm,74 while in the team

19th century] and the transition from special chartering to general incorporation eroded the
persuasiveness of the concession theory, as the connection between a corporate charter and a
state act became less significant.").
69
First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (emphasis added); see
also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 999,
1011-12 (discussing the decline of the concession theory); David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 212 (stating that "[t]he decline of the ultra vires idea most
clearly reveals movement away from the artificial entity concept of corporate power that was
inherent in special chartering.... [T]raditional 19th-century theory insisted that corporations
lacked any powers beyond those conferred by the legislature. As early as 1898, a treatise writer
could state that the ultra vires doctrine was 'disappearing.' By the 1920s, most states accepted
the view that a corporation could not plead ultra vires in defense to a suit on a wholly or even
partly executed contract. Also rejected was the old rule preventing shareholder validation of ultra
vires conduct. These conclusions implicitly denied that corporations possessed only such powers
as the state conferred on them. By 1930, the doctrine of ultra vires had attained its present
insignificance." (citations omitted)).
70
Padfield, RehabilitatingConcession Theory, supra note 65, at 333. See generally David
Ciepley, Neither Persons nor Associations: Against ConstitutionalRights for Corporations, 1
J.L. & CTs. 221 (2013).
71
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director
Primacy].
72
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team ProductionTheory of CorporateLaw, 85
VA. L. REv. 247,287-98 (1999) (describing a team production model for corporation law).
n

ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BLACK LETTER OUTLINES: CORPORATIONS

327-32 (5th ed. 2006).
Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
74
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1423-25, 1442 (1993) (arguing that
directors are ultimately in control of the corporation, but that the directors should exercise their
discretion to place shareholder interests ahead of non-shareholder interests); accord Bainbridge,
DirectorPrimacy, supra note 71, at 549-50.
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production theory Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout claim that the board of
directors acts as a mediating hierarch among various stakeholders for the
benefit of the corporation as a whole." The benefit reporting provisions may tie
directors' hands more than an extreme director primacy advocate would prefer,
but corporate reporting requirements are not new and can be seen simply as
part of the regulatory system within which the directors operate.76 For team
production theorists, the benefit reporting requirements may even help facilitate
the mediating role of the board, by requiring some contemplation and
discussion of a wide range of stakeholder interests. 7 The required use of a
third-party standard may be seen as another burden on the board, but the Model
Benefit Corporation Legislation, upon which many state benefit corporation
statutes are based, allows benefit corporations, presumably through the board of
directors, to retain authority over deciding which third-party standard to
apply. 7 8
The nexus-of-contracts theory79 and contractarianism 80 view the
corporation not as a separate entity, but as an accumulation of private contracts

7
76

See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 72.

Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy, supra note 71, at 564 (quoting economist Milton
Friedman
in noting that decision-making in a corporation is constrained by "the basic rules of society");
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV.

83, 102-03 (2004) (describing the broad powers of the board of directors, but also noting the
contractual and legal limits of those powers).
n
Blair & Stout, supra note 72, at 275-79 (explaining that directors should consider the
interests of various team members, not just shareholders, when acting for the good of the
corporation); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1203 (2002) (describing team production theory as suggesting that allowing
directors to consider various stakeholders may encourage firm-specific investment by those
stakeholders); accordOmari Scott Simmons, The CorporateImmune System: Governancefrom
the Inside Out, 2013 U. IL.L. REV. 1131, 1151 n.114.
78

MODEL

BENEFIT

CORP.
LEGIS.
§
401(a)(1)(iv)
(2014),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/ModelBenefit CorpLegislation.pdf (stating
that the benefit corporation must disclose the "process and rationale for selecting or changing the
third-party standard").
7
See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 18 (1996) (stating that the firm is
"a nexus of contracts," in other words the "firm is in essence the common signatory of a group of
contracts"); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Boardof Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 25-29 (2002) (arguing that the board of directors serves as the nexus of contracts for the
firm). But see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 830-36 (1999) (challenging the
nexus-of-contracts conception of the firm). See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
80
Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived,
42
SETON HALL L. REv. 879, 905 (2012) (describing aggregate theory as consistent with the
contractarian approach).
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between stakeholders. 8 ' The contractarian model views the firm as "a nexus or
web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations among
the various inputs making up the firm." 82 In the contractarian model, statutes
play the role of establishing defaults and reducing transaction costs, but
typically enable stakeholders to bargain around the default rules. 83 The Model
Benefit Corporation Legislation departs from contractarianism through a
number of mandatory provisions that firms may not contract around, such as
the general public benefit purpose, third-party standard usage, benefit reporting,
and stakeholder consideration.84 Delaware's PBC law, however, has more
contractarian roots, allowing firms to contract regarding third-party standard
usage and the specific benefit purpose chosen. Still, Delaware law does
mandate that the firms "operate in a responsible and sustainable manner" and
that directors balance the interest of "those materially affected by the
corporation's conduct" with the interests of shareholders and the specific public
purpose(s).85 Reporting is also required by Delaware, but Delaware allows
firms to choose to report only every other year (instead of annually) and the
reporting does not have to be publicly disclosed unless agreed to in the firm's
governing documents.8 6
As described above, each of the three major theories is at play in the
different benefit corporation statutes. In the benefit corporation area, most
states have mostly gravitated toward either the Delaware framework or the
The Delaware public benefit'
Model Benefit Corporation framework.
corporation law largely favors private ordering and appears to favor a nexus-ofMohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of CorporateLaw, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L.
465, 470 (2009) (stating that "contractarians argue, on freedom of contract principles, that
corporate law should permit shareholders to waive or modify the fiduciary duties of their
corporate managers, while so-called anti-contractarians argue, on equitable principles, that
81

corporate managers should be subject to certain minimum standards of conduct embodied by the
law of fiduciary duties"); Millon, supra note 69, at 201 (describing a major "distinction between
the corporation as an entity, with a real existence separate from its shareholders and other
participants, and the corporation as a mere aggregation of natural individuals without a separate
existence"); Pollman, Reconceiving CorporatePersonhood,supra note 68, at 1641.
82

STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICs 27-28 (2002) (explaining

that the term contract is used loosely in the contractarian model to mean "any process by which

property rights to assets are created, modified, or transferred").
Id. at 29-33 (stating that "[c]ontractarians assume that default rules are preferable to
83
mandatory rules in most settings;" claiming "[m]andatory rules are justifiable only if a default
rule would demonstrably create significant negative externalities or, perhaps, if one of the
contracting parties is demonstrably unable to protect itself through bargaining;" and calling the
nexus of contracts theory the "dominant theory of the firm in the legal academy").
84
See generally The Model Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/attomeys/

model-legislation (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).

§ 362(a) (2015).

85

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

86

Id. § 366.

87

Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise Chart, supranote 24.
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contracts theory of the firm with fewer mandatory and more enabling
provisions than the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation framework.88 Both
Delaware and the Model draw on portions of concession theory. Both
frameworks require directors to balance or consider the interests of a broad
group of stakeholders, benefiting society, likely in part because of the various
concessions by the state. In this case, the concession made by the state is not
only allowing incorporation and limited liability, but also bestowing the
favorable name of "benefit corporation." Both Delaware and the Model also
appear to pull from director primacy and team production theory. Team
production theory is probably the closest fit due to the statutory mandate to
consider a wide range of stakeholders. Neither Delaware nor the Model appear
to change the director primacy framework of current corporate law, but the
benefit corporation laws require directors to consider the interests of many
corporate stakeholders."9
C. CurrentState ofBenefit Reporting
The data discussed in this Article suggests that the vast majority of
benefit corporations are not complying with the statutory benefit reporting
requirements.90 Explanations for a compliance rate under ten percent could
include (1) relatively high learning costs, (2) the prevalence of small benefit
corporations with extremely limited resources, and (3) lack of sufficient
enforcement mechanisms. 91 Each of these explanations for the low compliance
88
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/EnablingBalance in CorporateLaw: An Essay on
the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1620-21 (1989) (describing the mandatory and
enabling aspects of corporate law); accord Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1461 (1989); cf Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy
Foundationsof Delaware CorporateLaw, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1752 (2006) (noting the
importance of private ordering in Delaware corporate law); see infra Table C. The Social
Purpose Corporation laws, which favor flexibility and private ordering as much or more than
Delaware, are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Murray, Social Enterprise
Innovation, supra note 5.
89
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101(c) (2014), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
documents/ModelBenefit CorpLegislation.pdf (stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this [chapter], [the enacting state's business corporation law] shall be generally applicable to all
benefit corporations"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015) (stating that "[tihe business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors").
90
See supra Part III.C.
9
Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REv. 789, 816-23

(2002); accord ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REDUCING THE RISK OF POLICY FAILURE:
CHALLENGES FOR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 7-8 (2000), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-

policy/46466287.pdf (stating "[n]ew rules may need to be accompanied by information
campaigns to ensure that they are brought to the notice of and made comprehensible to the target
group.... For small businesses in particular, the burden of assimilating and complying with
many complex and technical rules can be unreasonable and undermine confidence in regulators
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rate is discussed in more detail below, followed by a critique of the underlying
substantive statutory provisions.
1.

Potential Causes of Benefit Reporting Noncompliance

As with most legal changes, substantial learning costs may be incurred
as the market adjusts to the requirements.9 2 The benefit corporation form is still
not well known and the intricacies of the statutory requirements are even less
widely known." Even corporate attorneys may be unaware of the existence of
the relatively new benefit corporation form, not to mention the particulars of
the reporting requirements. 94 Michael Van Alstine has noted that learning costs
associated with new laws include time and resources to identify, analyze, and
digest the changes. 95 Widespread noncompliance can be explained, in part, due
to the nascent stage of benefit corporation laws and the resources that will be
needed for broader understanding of the requirements.
The small size of many benefit corporations is also a likely cause of
widespread benefit reporting noncompliance. In this Article's data, roughly a

and the regulatory structure"); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive
Officers: A Proposalfor Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 749, 796 (2007); Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaty Law and Legal
Transaction Costs, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1303, 1306-08 (2002).
92
Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, supra note 91, at 816-23 (noting and explaining
the learning costs arising from new law).

3

JEFFREY F. BEATTY ET AL., BusiNEss LAW AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 774 (6th ed.

2013) (improperly stating that benefit corporations must be certified); Haskell Murray, Etsy
Becomes a Certified B
Corporation, THE CONGLOMERATE
(May 9, 2012),
(noting
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/05/etsy-becomes-a-certified-b-corporation.html
that Etsy conflated the "benefit corporation" and "certified B corporation" terms). In fact, benefit
corporations do not have to be certified, they simply must use a third-party standard. MODEL
BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 40 1(c) (noting that there is no need for the benefit report to be audited or
certified by a third party).
94
While familiarity with benefit corporations is improving nationwide, there still seem to be
relatively few attorneys with a firm grasp of the details of the benefit corporation laws. Van
Alstine, supra note 91 (opining that lay people typically outsource the learning costs to legal
professionals); Findan Attorney, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/attomeys/find-an-attorney
(last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (listing attorneys interested in or with expertise in benefit corporation
law).
Van Alstine, The Costs ofLegal Change, supra note 91, at 816-23.
9
96
Rick Cohen, Some Unanswered Questions About Benefit Corporations,L3Cs, and Social
Enterprise More Generally, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr. 28, 2014), http://nonprofitquarterly.org
/2014/04/28/some-unanswered-questions-about-benefit-corporations-13cs-and-social-enterprisemore-generally/ (stating that most "social enterprises appear, for the moment, to be small
businesses"); Matt Pilon, Benefit CorporationsPrepareto Launch, HARTFORD Bus. (Sept. 15,
2014), http://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/20140915/PRINTEDITION/309119959/benefitcorporations-prepare-for-launch (noting that there are a few large benefit corporations, but that
most are small businesses).
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quarter of the benefit corporations do not even have websites. 97 Most of the
benefit corporations likely do not have consistent, sophisticated legal counsel
and even learning of the legal requirements of operating a benefit corporation
may be difficult for entities with such limited resources. Larger benefit
corporations such as Patagonia and Greyston Bakery did produce benefit
reports, and perhaps lack of financial and temporal resources is a main cause of
noncompliance among smaller benefit corporations.
Lack of effective statutory enforcement mechanisms may be another
explanation of widespread benefit report noncompliance. None of the four state
benefit corporation statutes relevant to this Article's data require filing of the
benefit report with the state or provided express penalties for non-compliance. 99
Benefit enforcement proceedings may be used for curbing non-compliance,
though most statutes do not mention benefit report violations specifically; the
statutes simply state that benefit enforcement proceedings can be brought for
violations of the benefit corporation law in general.' 00 Currently, however,
automatic standing to bring benefit enforcement proceedings is only given to
shareholders, directors, and owners of five percent or more of the equity in the
benefit corporation's parent company.' 0 Thus, the vast majority of
stakeholders that the benefit corporation statute requires directors to consider
are relatively helpless in enforcing their rights.1 0 2 Tamar Frankel, in her book
Trust and Honesty, claims that "[w]eak or no enforcement signals to the public
that breaking the law is not 'really very wrong.'. . . Morals and laws shape one
another."10 3 Here, enforcement of benefit corporation reporting requirements
seem incredibly weak, leading to early evidence of high levels of noncompliance, and, perhaps, a growing acceptance of violating the statutory
reporting requirements.

9
98

See infra Table A.
See infra Table D.

Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise Chart, supra note 24. Presumably, states like
99
Minnesota, which have statutes that require both filing the benefit report with the state and
include an express, significant penalty for noncompliance will experience much higher
compliance rates. MINN. STAT. § 304A.301(5) (2015) (stating that "[i]f a public benefit
corporation fails to file . . . the annual benefit report required by this section, the secretary of state
shall revoke the corporation's status as a public benefit corporation").
1oo

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

§

305(a) (2014), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/

documents/Model Benefit CorpLegislation.pdf. Currently, Nevada appears to be the only state
that expressly provides for the use of an enforcement proceeding for noncompliance with the
reporting requirements. NEV. REv. STAT. § 78B.030(3) (2013).
1o'

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

§ 305(c)(2)(i)-(iii).

Id. § 301(a)(1) (listing seven groups of stakeholders that directors of benefit corporations
must consider, including, shareholders, employees, customers, community, and the environment).
102

103

TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD

114(2006).
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Shareholders, especially a new crop of "impact investors," may be
willing to protect the interest of other stakeholders, but it remains to be seen
whether shareholders will be vigorous in protecting other stakeholders,
especially when the stakeholder interests conflict with the economic interests of
shareholders. 104 Even if shareholders are socially conscious and willing to play
the role of enforcer, some statutes limit standing to shareholders or groups of
shareholders holding two percent or more of the outstanding stock of the
benefit corporation.105 Further, the statutory prohibition on monetary damages
in benefit enforcement proceedings will likely limit the frequency and
effectiveness of these lawsuits.106 The benefit corporation proponents' white
paper suggests that the reporting requirements are for the benefit of both
shareholders and the general public, including customers. 10 7 While the
shareholders might be adequate guardians of their own interests, it does not
seem likely that shareholders will do an adequate job defending the interests of
the general public. Benefit corporation proponents might argue that the general
public will pressure benefit corporations to use a good third-party standard, but,
if pressure from the general public is sufficient, the benefit corporation statutes
themselves would appear unnecessary. 08 Some may argue that the benefit
corporation statutes are helping shape a norm, and even if enforcement is
relatively low, the social norms will help enforce the intent of the statute. 0 9
While statutes might help shape norms in some cases, at least occasional

104

See ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING: TRANSFORMING

How WE

(2011) (describing impact investors who
seek not only economic value, but also social and environmental value). Even if impact investors
do not file benefit enforcement proceedings with significant frequency, the ability to make a
credible threat to sue may lead to greater benefit corporation compliance.
105
Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise Chart, supra note 24 (showing eight states with the
two percent equity stake requirement for shareholder standing in benefit enforcement
proceedings).
MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE 10-11

§ 305(b); cf Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Twenty Years After
Smith v. Van Gorkom: An Essay on the Limits of Civil Liability of CorporateDirectors and the
Role of Shareholder Inspection Rights, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 283, 288-90 (2006) (claiming that
106

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

even concepts, like the duty of care, that are not legally enforced may still deter poor conduct if
directors fear public embarrassment in a judicial opinion. However, if monetary damages are
unavailable or unlikely, the plaintiff's bar may not bring those cases and the threat of
embarrassment will dissipate.).
107
PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 19-20.
108

Trojian, Interview, supra note 32 (claiming that the market would punish benefit

corporations that provide less transparency and weak reports).
109
See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate
Illegality (with Notes on How CorporateLaw CouldReinforce InternationalLaw Norms), 87 VA.

L. REv. 1279, 1328 (2001) (noting that law can reinforce norms); Edward M. Iacobucci,
Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Prudential Regulation of Financial Institutions, 16
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 183, 193 (2015) (noting the social norm for complying with the law).
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enforcement of the statute or judicial denouncement of offending behavior is
likely needed for creation of a strong norm." 0
2. Substantive Problems with Benefit Reporting Provisions
Even perfect compliance rates, however, will not remedy all the
problems with the current benefit corporation statutes. The substantive statutory
provisions of the benefit reporting requirements are also flawed. The reporting
requirements are overly vague, in addition to being under-enforced. As noted
above, the statutes merely require narrative descriptions of the ways public
benefit was created by the company and the hindrances the company faced.'
The statutes do not require reporting of quantifiable items and give the benefit
''2
corporations an extreme amount of freedom in deciding what to report.
Benefit corporation proponents claim that the third-party standard requirement
is at the heart of the benefit corporation legislation and works with the
reporting requirements for transparency." 3 There is, however, little to no
oversight or assurance of quality with regards to the third-party standards.' 14
The state benefit corporation statutes usually require that the third-party
standard be "comprehensive," "credible," and "transparent," but do not clearly
explain what these terms mean or how the requirements will be enforced." 5
Further, the statutes do not appear to provide a clear enforcement mechanism to
ensure that the third-party standards are actually useful. One benefit
corporation listed "John Franco" as their third-party standard, which may or
may not comply with the statute, but if shareholders choose not to challenge,
then there does not appear to be a way to make sure the third-party standard

Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44
UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1106 (1997) (describing Delaware corporate law decisions in the fiduciary
duty context as parables of good and bad actors, which may affect director behavior, even if the
duties are not enforced); Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of CorporateLaw, 26 STAN. L.
POL'Y REv. 1, 56 (2015) (arguing that "corporate law shapes behavior not through imposing
liability, but rather through producing information" and affecting reputations).
II
See supra Part II.C.
&

110

112

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

§§

401-02 (2014), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/

documents/ModelBenefit CorpLegislation.pdf.
"
PROPONENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 18.
114
Third Party Standard, supra note 18 (listing roughly a dozen, varying, third-party
standards, which, they note is not an exhaustive list).
"1s
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102(a). Perhaps, the third-party standard requirements
could be enforced by a benefit enforcement proceeding, but this seems suboptimal as
shareholders may choose not to enforce if the third-party standard is low cost, and the benefit
enforcement proceedings do not provide for the recovery of monetary damages.
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even complies with the minimal requirements of the benefit corporation statute,
for the benefit of all stakeholders."
D. FutureofSocial Reporting

Currently, the benefit corporation reporting suffers from low
compliance rates and weak substantive provisions. Existing statutes could be
strengthened through amendments. States that are considering benefit
corporation legislation for the first time should consider departing from existing
models to improve reporting requirement. Suggestions for improvement follow
below.
First, and most obviously, compliance rates could likely be improved
dramatically by requiring state filing and clear, significant consequences for
non-compliance." 7 Currently, a handful of states and the Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation require filing the benefit report with the Secretary of
State." 8 Most states, however, have resisted requiring benefit report filing with
the state, likely due to state resource limitations."'9 Even required state filing
may not be effective without express penalties for non-compliance. A few
states have adopted express penalties for non-compliance with benefit
reporting. Minnesota's public benefit corporation statute provides that if "a
public benefit corporation fails to file an annual benefit report in accordance
with this section within 90 days of the date on which an annual benefit report is
due, the secretary of state shall revoke the corporation's status as a public
benefit corporation." 20 Using the loss of benefit corporation status as the only
punishment for noncompliance may be unwise, as benefit corporations
unsatisfied with the form may try to use not filing a report to convert to a
2013 Benefit Corporation Report, NELLA TERRA CELLARS, http://www.nellaterra.com/
about-us/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). Courts have not provided guidance on whether a single,
relatively unknown individual could serve as a statutorily compliant third-party standard, though
the "credible" requirement included in some state benefit corporation statutes might create an
issue. According to the California benefit corporation statute, a third-party standard must be
"comprehensive," have "no material financial relationship with the benefit corporation,"
"[a]ccess[] necessary and appropriate expertise to assess overall corporate social and
environmental performance," "[u]se[] a balanced multistakeholder approach, including a public
comment period of at least 30 days to develop the standard," and make the information about the
third-party standard publicly available. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601 (Deering 2015).
Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise Chart, supra note 24 (showing 13 states and the
"7
model legislation that require state filing of the benefit corporation reports in their corporate
social enterprise statutes). Social enterprise statutes include benefit corporations, general benefit
corporations, public benefit corporations, sustainable business corporations, specific benefit
corporation, and social purpose corporation. Id.
118
Id. We will be able to test whether these provisions requiring state filing are effective in
coming years when the statutes are more mature and there is data to analyze.
19
Id.
120
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301(5) (West 2015).
116
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traditional corporation without having to obtain the super-majority shareholder
approval generally required. While Minnesota provides for dissenters' rights,
the payment of fair value to shareholders, if the failure to file the benefit report
is intentional, proving scienter in these cases may be extremely difficult.121
Better penalties for non-compliance with the statutory reporting requirements
could include fines and eventual administrative dissolution.1 2 2 Florida's benefit
corporation statute provides a reasonable enforcement scheme. In Florida, the
benefit corporation statute utilizes private enforcement by allowing courts to
award costs and attorney fees to the shareholders that bring benefit reporting
failure to the attention of the court.1 2 3 The benefit reports, however, are not just
for the shareholders' benefit; customers, employees, and other stakeholders are
potential beneficiaries of the reporting and could make an argument to be given
statutory standing. Giving standing to other stakeholders, even for the narrow
case of enforcing reporting, might concern managers. Therefore, perhaps the
statute could provide for a demand letter to the board of directors, followed by
a reasonable waiting period, and fee-shifting if frivolous cases are brought.1 2 4
Second, even if compliance rates were improved by the methods above,
there would still be problems with the weakness of the substantive provisions
of the reporting requirements. As described in the previous section, the benefit
reporting requirements are quite general and vague, merely requiring a
narrative description of the ways the public benefit was pursued, created, and
hindered.1 25 Picking more objective reporting items, however, would be
difficult given the various industries that benefit corporations span.1 2 6 A
detailed, rules-based approach to reporting might also suffocate firms, stifle

Id. §304A.301(7).
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-C:13 (LexisNexis 2015) (stating that "[i]f the secretary of
state determines that a benefit corporation established pursuant to this chapter fails to make
available its annual benefit report pursuant to RSA 293-C:12 and RSA 293-C:13, the secretary of
state shall administratively dissolve the corporation").
123
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.613 (West 2015); cf David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the
Private Attorney General: Evidencefrom Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244 (2012)
(describing government's attempt to "control undesirable behavior [through, among other
options]... regulation via private litigation in courts").
124
The demand requirements could be modeled on Delaware's books and records statute.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2015). Requiring a demand letter to the board would respect the
director primacy model of corporate governance. See generally Bainbridge, Director Primacy,
supra note 71.
125
See supra Part IV.C.2.
126
Perhaps "percentage of employees paid a livable wage" could be one objective measure to
require in reporting, though some industries pay much higher wages than others. Perhaps
"percentage of revenue or hours of time given to charity" could be another objective measure to
require in reporting, though this might discourage benefit corporations that create socially
focused products and services, yet do not give to charity.
121

122
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innovation, and decrease intrinsic motivation. 127 Instead, perhaps the statutes
could retain some autonomy in reporting, and add a bit more specificity to the
requirements, by allowing each benefit corporation (or the third-party standard
by which the benefit corporation is measured) to choose at least a few
quantifiable items. To allow stakeholders to identify trends, the statutes could
require benefit corporations or third-party standard providers to commit to the
chosen metrics for a set number of years, perhaps five years.1 2 8 Requiring thirdparty standard providers to set metrics might be the superior route as it would
allow comparison between the benefit corporations that choose the same
standard; the freedom of benefit corporations choosing the metrics would be
limited if this route were followed, but the benefit corporations would still
remain free to choose the most appropriate third-party standard.
Third, while most benefit corporation statutes require use of a thirdparty standard, the quality of the standard used is not currently regulated.1 2 9
More recent benefit corporation statutes do use qualifying words for the thirdparty standard like "recognized," "credible," and "transparent," but, to date, no
case law has determined exactly what these words mean or which third-party
standards will be statutorily sufficient. 30 Third-party standard providers, if
regulated or overseen, might be as useful as proponents hope them to be.
Perhaps state benefit corporation statutes should require an additional fee to
fund a regulator, given that most state governments are stretched to a breaking
point.' 3 ' Alternatively, perhaps a private enforcement system could be set up by

127

Park, supra note 54. See generally Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic and
Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and New Directions, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 1,

54-67 (2000) (suggesting that hampering autonomy can limit intrinsic motivation and that
threats, such as those accompanying extrinsic directives, can undermine intrinsic motivation).
128

There would need to be a mechanism to amend the reporting if the business pivoted.

Perhaps, approval by both the shareholders and the third-party standard provider would prove
sufficient. Currently, most benefit corporation statutes require reporting any change in third-party
standard provider and any inconsistency in the application of the third-party standard. See
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a) (2014), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
documents/Model BenefitCorpLegislation.pdf. The statutes are less clear, however, regarding
changes in the way a given third-party standard measures impact, and even if the statutes

required reporting of those changes, mere disclosure may not be sufficient to lead to useful,
consistent social reporting by benefit corporations.
129
Third Party Standard, supra note 18 (providing a non-exhaustive list of third-party
standards).
130
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102; Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise Chart, supra
note 24.
131
Such a fee, however, might render benefit corporations even less popular, given the
additional costs and current relatively low benefit. Joan Heminway, Why Do Social Enterprise
Entrepreneurs Want Benefit Corporations?, Bus. L. PROF BLOG (Apr. 2, 2015),

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/businesslaw/2015/04/why-do-social-enterprise-entrepreneurswant-benefit-corporations.html (questioning the usefulness of the benefit corporation law,
especially for small companies, given the additional burdens already imposed by the statutes).
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providing incentives to private actors to regulate the third-party standard
providers. The third-party standard providers purport to protect consumers and
other stakeholders, but the quality and effectiveness of the third-party standard
providers should be monitored. 3 2 The government is bestowing the name
"benefit corporation" on these entities and thus should be allowed to ensure that
some benefit to society is actually being provided. 133
Finally, perhaps there should be a reporting exception, or scaling in the
reporting requirements, for small and/or young benefit corporations. The
emerging growth company definition of $1 billion in annual gross revenue or
less, recently utilized by the Securities and Exchange Commission, might be a
possible threshold to set, though it would exclude virtually all of the current
benefit corporations.1 34 A threshold of $1 million, or even $100,000, in annual
gross revenue would exclude many benefit corporations and would place the
reporting burdens more appropriately on entities that could properly bear them.
If the statutes were amended to exclude some benefit corporations from
mandatory reporting, those excluded benefit corporations could always opt-in
and voluntarily comply. As to where the benefit reports should be located,
given that approximately a quarter of the active benefit corporations in this
sample do not even have a website, perhaps the benefit reports could be
provided on the relevant Secretary of State's website with open access to
potential customers and investors." Locating the benefit reports of all benefit
corporations from a particular state in a single place would also allow

The United Kingdom's regulator of Community Interest Companies ("CIC") runs on a limited
budget and staff. See About Us, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/officeof-the-regulator-of-community-interest-companies/about (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (noting that
the CIC regulator works part-time and is supported by a staff of six individuals). The CIC
Regulator oversees over 10,000 CICs, has achieved nearly 100% reporting compliance, and has a
budget under 300,000 pounds. See MORGAN LEWIS, LEGAL ISSUES IN IMPACT INVESTING: AT
HOME AND ABROAD (2015).
132
The ineffectiveness of rating agencies in the most recent financial crisis can foreshadow
possible problems with third-party standards if the third-party standards are under-regulated. See
Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the Build Up to the
Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1149 (2009) (suggesting increased disclosure and
increased potential liability for wrongdoing by rating agencies).
133
See supra Part IV.B (discussing concession theory and the governmental grant of
privileges to business entities).
134
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act: FrequentlyAsked Questions: GenerallyApplicable
Questions on Title I of the JOBS Act, SEC (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/guidance/cfjjobsactfaq-title-i-general.htm (noting that an "emerging growth company" is
"an issuer with 'total annual gross revenues' of less than $1 billion during its most recently
completed fiscal year").
13
See infra Table A. States with stretched budgets may balk at the idea of any additional
infrastructure to provide these reports. Alternatively, one or multiple universities could assist
with compiling and posting the benefit reports.
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stakeholders to compare benefit corporations to one another. 136 Both scaling of
the reporting requirements and ensuring that the reports are publicly available
would go a long way in improving benefit reporting. Legal clinics, such as
those at Georgetown and UC-Hastings, might be able to help smaller benefit
corporations with reporting compliance if no size-based exception is granted.1 37
In short, benefit corporation statutory reporting requirements still have
significant opportunities for improvement.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article has considered the benefit corporation reporting
requirements by examining data, policy, and theory. After analysis, this Article
has shown that the benefit corporation statutes' reporting scheme is in need of
significant improvement. The benefit corporation statutes analyzed in this
Article have yielded abysmally low compliance rates below ten percent.13 8
Further, the benefit corporation statutes' substantive reporting requirements are
vague and subject to little oversight. 39 In theory, the third-party standard
providers could offer the necessary oversight, but the third-party standard
providers are unregulated and of varying quality.1 4 0 Improved benefit
corporation reporting could be achieved by required state filing, significant
non-compliance penalties, quantitative reporting requirements, and regulation
of third-party standard providers. Future research can build on this initial study
and its early data to determine whether progress on benefit reporting is being
made over time and whether variations in state statutes are affecting
compliance rates.

Comparison may be more difficult if varying third-party standards are used, but in this
sample seven out of eight of the benefit corporations used B Lab as their third-party standard
provider.
137
Social Enterpriseand Nonprofit Clinic, GEO. L. CTR., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/
academics/academic-programs/clinical-programs/our-clinics/social-enterprise/ (last visited Oct.
8, 2015); Social Enterprise & Economic Empowerment Clinic, UC HASTINGS,
http://www.uchastings.edulacademics/clinicalprograms/clinics/socialenterpriseandeconomicempowerment/index.php
(last visited Oct. 8,
2015).
138
See infra Table A.
139
See supra Part IV.C.
140
Third Party Standard, supra note 18 (listing approximately a dozen possible third-party
standard providers).
136
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TABLE A: BENEFIT REPORTING DATA

State
California
Hawaii
New York
Virginia
Total

Total Inactive/Dissolved/Merged
81
4
18
20
123

9
0
2
12
23

Website Non-Responsive
56
3
13
4
76

14
1
3
4
22

Report
5
0
3
0
8

TABLE B: FILING BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORTS
State
Arizona1 41
Arkansasl 42
District of Columbia1 43
Massachusetts 144
Minnesotal 45
Nebraskal 46
New Hampshire 147
New Jersey' 48
Pennsylvania14 9
Rhode Island 5 0
South Carolinal 5
Utahb2

File With
Corporation Commission
Secretary of State
Mayor
State Secretary
Secretary of State
Secretary of State
Secretary of State
Department of the Treasury
Department of State of the Commonwealth
Secretary of State
Secretary of State
Division of Corporations

Fee
$10
$70
Unstated
$75
$35
$25
$35
$70
$70
$60
$10
$15

141
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 10-2442(D) (LexisNexis 2015); ARIz. CORP. COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2015, http://www.azcc.gov/Divisions/Corporations/Legislativechanges-update-Dec-2014.pdf.
142
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-401(e)(3) (2015).
143

D.C. CODE § 29-1304.01(e) (2015).

'4

MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E,

§

16(d) (West 2015).

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301(1) (West 2015).
146
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-414(4) (LexisNexis 2015), amended by 2015 Nebraska laws
L.B. 35.
145

147
148

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-C:13(IV) (2015).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 18-11 d.(1) (West 2015).

15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 333 1(e) (West 2015).
7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.3-13(d) (2015) (including both the annual report and benefit report
filing under the $60 fee).
149

15o

151
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-500(E) (2015); STATE OF S.C. SEC'Y OF STATE, ANNUAL BENEFIT
REPORT: BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://www.sos.sc.gov/forms/benefit%20corporation/Benefit
%20Corporation%20Annual%20Report.pdf
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TABLE C: MODEL LEGISLATION V. DELAWARE FOR BENEFIT REPORTING

Provision
File with State
Available to
Shareholders
Posted on Website
Use of Third-Party
Frequency
Substance

Model
Yes1 5 3
Yesi0 4

Delaware
No
Yes'

Requiredise
Required
Annuallsu
"(a) Contents.-A benefit
corporation shall prepare an
annual benefit report including all
of the following:
(1) A narrative description of:
(i) The ways in which the benefit
corporation pursued general
public benefit during the year and
the extent to which general public
benefit was created.
(ii) Both:
in which the benefit

Optional' 7
5
Optional'"
At Least Bienniali 6 t
"[A] statement as to the
corporation's promotion of
the public benefit or public
benefits identified in the
certificate of incorporation
and of the best interests of
those materially affected by
the corporation's conduct.
The statement shall include:
(1) The objectives the board
of directors has established
to promote such public

§ 16-l b0402(4) (LexisNexis 2015); Benefit Corporation, UTAH DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, http://corporations.utah.gov/businesslbc.htnl (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (under
"Frequently Asked Questions," select "How to renew a Benefit Corporation?").
'53
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §402(d) (2014), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
152

UTAH CODE ANN.

documentsModeleBenefitrCorptLegislation.pdfr
'5a Id. § 402(a). The benefit report must be sent to shareholders on the earlier of"(1) 120 days
following the end of the fiscal year of the benefit corporation; or (2) the same time that the
benefit corporation delivers any other annual report to its shareholders." Id.
155
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2015).
156
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 402(b). Section 402(c) states the following:
If a benefit corporation does not have an Internet website, the benefit

corporation shall provide a copy of its most recent benefit report, without
charge, to any person that requests a copy, but the compensation paid to

directors and financial or proprietary information included in the benefit
report may be omitted from the copy of the benefit report provided.

Id § 402(c).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c)(2).
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIs. § 401(a)(2).
The third-party standard must be
"comprehensive," "not controlled by the benefit corporation? credible," and "transparent." Id §
152

158

102.
15

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c)(3).

§ 401 (a).

160

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

161

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b).
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54
Provision

I Model
corporation pursued a specific
public benefit that the articles of
incorporation state it is the
purpose of the benefit corporation
to create; and
(B) the extent to which that
specific public benefit was
created.
(iii) Any circumstances that have
hindered the creation by the
benefit corporation of general
public benefit or specific public
benefit.
(iv) The process and rationale for
selecting or changing the thirdparty standard used to prepare the
benefit report.
(2) An assessment of the overall
social and environmental
performance of the benefit
corporation against a third-party
standard:
(i) applied consistently with any
application of that standard in
prior benefit reports; or
(ii) accompanied by an
explanation of the reasons for:
(A) any inconsistent application;
or
(B) the change to that standard
from the one used in the
immediately prior report.
(3) The name of the benefit
director and the benefit officer, if
any, and the address to which
correspondence to each of them
may be directed.
(4) The compensation paid by the
benefit corporation during the
year to each director in the
capacity of a director.

[Vol. 118

Delaware
benefit or public benefits
and interests;
(2) The standards the board
of directors has adopted to
measure the corporation's
progress in promoting such
public benefit or public
benefits and interests;
(3) Objective factual
information based on those
standards regarding the
corporation's success in
meeting the objectives for
promoting such public
benefit or public benefits
and interests; and
(4) An assessment of the
corporation's success in
meeting the objectives and
promoting such public
benefits
benefit or public
163
and interests."

(5) The statement of the benefit

163

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 366(b).
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2015]
Provision

Model
director described in section
302(c).
(6) A statement of any connection
between the organization that
established the third-party
standard, or its directors, officers
or any holder of 5% or more of
the governance interests in the
organization, and the benefit
corporation or its directors,
officers or any holder of 5% or
more of the outstanding shares of
the benefit corporation, including
any financial or governance
relationship which might
materially affect the credibility of
the use of the third-party

55

Delaware

standard."l 62

162

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

§ 401.
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56
TABLE

Name/
State

D: BENEFIT

ThirdParty
Standard

[Vol. 118

CORPORATIONS REPORTS AND COMPLIANCE

Process +
ationale
or
electing
hird>arty
tandard
"3PS")
NY+CA)

Ways
ursued/
reated
enerall
pecific
public
Denefit
'NY+CA)

ndered
ursuit of
enerall
pecifie
ublic
enefit
NY+CA)
6

Assessment
)f overall
iocial
performance
repared in
ccordance
ith 3PS
+CA)

5%+
wners
of
benefit
orp.
(NY+
CA)'

Nella
Terra
Cellas,

Franco

Inc. (CA)
2 pgs.
Patagonia

Inc.66
(CA)

43 pgs.

B Lab

(Certified

'x

V/

since Dec.

2011)

Rimon

B Lab

Law

(Certified

Group

since June

(CA)
3 pgs.

In this column (and others), I attempted to be exceedingly generous in my assessment,
counting a firm as complying if anything in the report could be reasonably construed as
addressing the statutory requirement.
165
It is possible, though probably unlikely because most benefit corporations are closely-held,
that some of the companies had no 5%+ owners. As a practice pointer, benefit corporations with
no 5%+ owners should expressly note this fact in their benefit report. It is possible that the
benefit corporations consider this to be "proprietary or financial information," which may be
omitted from the benefit report as posted online, but if that is the case it should be noted as well.
166
Patagonia Works is the parent company for benefit corporations Patagonia Inc., Great
Pacific Iron Works, Fletcher Chouinard Designs, Inc., and Patagonia Provisions, Inc. See
164

PATAGONIA WORKS, ANNUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORT: FIscAL YEAR 2013, at 5 (2013),

http://www.patagonia.com/pdf/en US/bcorpannual-reportt2014.pdf. However, there does not
appear to be any statutory provision allowing for the consolidation of benefit reporting by a
parent company. Bill Clark, the drafter of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, agrees that
each benefit corporation, even if a subsidiary, must produce a benefit report. See E-mail from Bill
Clark to Haskell Murray (July 8, 2015, 6:30 AM) (on file with author) (noting that the model
benefit corporation statute, in its current form, requires each benefit corporation to produce its
own report).
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2015]
Name/
State

ThirdParty
Standard

rocess +
ays
ationale
ursued/
or
reated
selecting
generall
thirdspecific
party
public
standard benefit
("3PS")

57

ndered
ssessment
ursuit of f overall
enerall
iocial
specific
performance
public
prepared in
benefit
accordance
Y+CA) wth 3PS

(N+CA)

5%+
awners
f
benefit
corp.
(N+
CA)t 65

(NY'+CA)

(N+CA)

Singularity
Educ. Grp.
(CA)
2 pgs. & 37

B Lab

V

V

x

/

B Lab

V

V

V

/

x67

/

Scientific
Certif. Sys.,
Inc. (CA)
50 pgs.

168
pages______

Greyston
B Lab
Bakery Inc. (Certified
(NY)
since June
19 pgs.
2008)
B Lab
Singlebrook
Tech., Inc.
(Certified
(NY)
since Mar.
11pgs.
2009)
Turnstile
B Lab
Tours, Inc.
(Certified
(NY)
since an.
9 pgs.
2015)

V

i

V

(NY+

V

167
The Scientific Certification Systems, Inc. report mentions that ownership remains in the
hands of the founders and key company staff (current and past), but does not state which
founders or staff hold over five percent of the outstanding stock. See SCS GLOBAL SERVS.,
ANNUAL
REPORT
2013,
at
11,
https://www.scsglobalservices.com/files/resources/
scs annualreport 2013.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
168
Singularity Education Group had a 2-page benefit corporation report and a 37-page impact
report. I considered both reports.
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